This figure visualizes how learning their personal stake in the outcome changed participants' preferences for the different distribution rules. Each panel shows the change in participants' willingness-to-pay (WTP) after they were informed of their role as a small, middle, or large creditor. A distribution shifted to the right of the central line (positive values) means that participants valued that rule more once they knew their role. A distribution shifted to the left (negative values) means they valued that rule less.
The chart clearly reveals a pattern of self-interest. Small creditors (left column), for example, significantly increased their preference for the 'Constrained Equal Awards' rule (A), which benefits them, while their preference for the other rules decreased. In contrast, large creditors (right column) began to strongly favor the 'Constrained Equal Losses' rule (L) and the Talmud rule (T), while their liking for the 'Constrained Equal Awards' rule (A) dropped significantly. The asterisks indicate that these shifts are statistically significant and not just a result of chance.